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Abstract
■ Adaptive behavior involves interactions between systems
regulating Pavlovian and instrumental control of actions. Here,
we present the first investigation of the neural mechanisms
underlying aversive Pavlovian–instrumental transfer using
fMRI in humans. Recent evidence indicates that these Pavlovian
influences on instrumental actions are action-specific: Instru-
mental approach is invigorated by appetitive Pavlovian cues
but inhibited by aversive Pavlovian cues. Conversely, instru-
mental withdrawal is inhibited by appetitive Pavlovian cues
but invigorated by aversive Pavlovian cues. We show that BOLD
responses in the amygdala and the nucleus accumbens were
associated with behavioral inhibition by aversive Pavlovian cues,
irrespective of action context. Furthermore, BOLD responses in
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex differed between approach
and withdrawal actions. Aversive Pavlovian conditioned stimuli
modulated connectivity between the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex and the caudate nucleus. These results show that action-
specific aversive control of instrumental behavior involves the
modulation of fronto-striatal interactions by Pavlovian condi-
tioned stimuli. ■
INTRODUCTION
Adaptive behavior depends on interactions between sys-
tems regulating affective versus rational, instrumental
control (Huys et al., 2011; Evans, 2008; Daw, Niv, & Dayan,
2005). Many decision-making phenomena that appear
irrational, such as the framing effect (Tversky & Kahneman,
1981) and the optimism bias (Sharot, Riccardi, Raio, &
Phelps, 2007;Weinstein, 1980),may reflect Pavlovian impact
of affective cues on instrumental behavior (Dayan & Huys,
2008; Dayan, Niv, Seymour, & Daw, 2006). Elucidating the
neural mechanisms underlying Pavlovian effects on instru-
mental actions is crucial, not just for understanding normal
behavior but also because Pavlovian effects are implicated
in neuropsychiatric disorders (e.g., addiction and depres-
sion; Flagel et al., 2011; Dayan & Huys, 2008). Here we
investigate these mechanisms by using fMRI and a well-
established paradigm for assessing Pavlovian influences
on instrumental responding: Pavlovian–instrumental trans-
fer (PIT).
Existing neuroimaging work on PIT has focused on the
potentiation of appetitive instrumental responding by
appetitive cues (Bray, Rangel, Shimojo, Balleine, &
OʼDoherty, 2008; Talmi, Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 2008).
For example, Talmi et al. (2008) have revealed BOLD re-
sponses in the nucleus accumbens and the amygdala
during appetitive PIT. However, no imaging study and
only a few behavioral studies have addressed the effects
of aversive cues on human behavior (Huys et al., 2011;
Di Giusto, Di Giusto, & King, 1974). This is pertinent, be-
cause the influence of aversive expectations on behavior
likely plays an important role in several psychiatric con-
ditions (Bijttebier, Beck, Claes, & Vandereycken, 2009).
We adapted a paradigm that previously showed signif-
icant behavioral PIT of both appetitive and aversive cues
(Huys et al., 2011). Our first question was whether struc-
tures identified as contributing to appetitive PIT—amygdala
and nucleus accumbens—are also involved in aversive
PIT. The second question concerned action specificity, an
aspect of PIT that so far has received little attention. We
have recently discovered that the effect of Pavlovian cues
depended on the valence of instrumental behaviors:
Whereas appetitive Pavlovian conditioned stimuli (CSs)
potentiated approach and inhibited withdrawal, aversive
CSs suppressed approach (as in conditioned suppression)
but potentiated withdrawal (Huys et al., 2011). This finding
resonates with the fact that many neuropsychiatric dis-
orders prominently involve abnormal control not only of
appetitive behaviors (e.g., approach) but also of aversive
behaviors (e.g., withdrawal; Trew, 2011). If Pavlovian cues
have opposite effects on these different actions, then a
better understanding of the mechanisms underlying this
action specificity should help resolve how instrumental
behavior is controlled by Pavlovian cues.
Action specificity suggests that affective cues might inter-
act differently with systems that code for approach or
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withdrawal.We askedwhether action specificity in Pavlovian
control involves differential influences on neural regions
that encode action specificity. One possibility is that it
involves direct Pavlovian modulation of regions that encode
action specificity. Another possibility is that Pavlovian cues
modulate the influence of regions that are action specific
on regions that implement instrumental behavior. One
region prominently associated with instrumental behavior
is the striatum (the caudate nucleus and putamen; Balleine
& OʼDoherty, 2010). We tested these hypotheses by con-
ducting univariate analyses of action-specific PIT effects as
well as functional connectivity analyses of action-specific
influences on the striatum during PIT.
METHODS
Participants
Fifteen right-handed volunteers participated in a behav-
ioral experiment conducted in a dummy scanner environ-
ment before the fMRI experiment (“behavioral group”).
Subsequently, 20 right-handed volunteers participated
in the fMRI experiment (“fMRI group”). The experiment
was approved by the local ethics committee. Exclusion
criteria were claustrophobia, neurological or cardio-
vascular diseases, psychiatric disorders, regular use of
medication, use of psychotropic drugs, smoking, or metal
parts in the body. Written informed consent was obtained
before study procedures. Two fMRI participants were re-
moved from analyses because of below-chance perfor-
mance in the final stage of the instrumental learning
phase and/or during the Pavlovian query trials. For two
other fMRI participants, one of the two sessions was
excluded: one participant did not complete the first ses-
sion because of discomfort in the scanner, and the juice
delivery setup failed for another participantʼs first session.
Accordingly, data are reported from 15 participants (six
women; mean age = 25.7 years, SD = 3.4 years) in the
behavioral group and 18 participants (11 women; mean
age = 23.8 years, SD = 3.5 years) in the fMRI group.
Pavlovian–Instrumental Transfer Paradigm
Participants performed the experimental task adapted
from Huys et al. (2011). The paradigm was programmed
using Matlab (2009b, TheMathWorks, Natick, MA) with
the Psychophysical Toolbox extension (Brainard, 1997).
The experiment consisted of two sessions, each with
three stages: (i) instrumental training, (ii) Pavlovian con-
ditioning, and (iii) PIT. The setup of the experiment was
the same for the two sessions, but different instrumental
and Pavlovian stimuli were used in each session.
Two major adaptations were made to the version used
by Huys et al. (2011): First, unlike Huys et al., primary
outcomes (juices) were used for Pavlovian conditioning,
whereas secondary outcomes (monetary) were used for
instrumental training. This was done to make sure that
the (de)motivating effects of the Pavlovian CSs were
not because of similarity in outcome with the instrumen-
tal action. This made our paradigm sensitive to general
as opposed to outcome-specific motivating effects of
Pavlovian CSs. Second, participants had to press a button
multiple times rather than just once. This generated an
additional dependent variable (the number of button
presses), which we anticipated to be sensitive to PIT
(cf. Talmi et al., 2008) and allowed us to look at para-
metric PIT effects in our fMRI analysis.
Instrumental Training
The instrumental task (Figure 1A) was framed in terms of
an approach/withdrawal go/no-go task. On each trial, an
instrumental stimulus (mushroom or shell) was pre-
sented centrally at the top of the screen. A dot appeared
at the bottom of the screen and moved upward at a con-
stant speed (reaching the top in 2.5 sec). Participants had
to choose whether to collect the instrumental stimulus
by steering the dot through it or whether not to collect
it by steering it past the stimulus. Each choice resulted in
monetary wins or losses (±5 cents). Participants influ-
enced the trajectory of the dot by pressing one button
repeatedly. Every button press added a fixed sideways
displacement to the dot trajectory. This displacement
decayed back to zero over time at a speed that was
calibrated before the experimental session to the maxi-
mum frequency at which participants were able to press
the button (mean maximum frequency was 4.9 Hz, SD =
2.0). There were two action contexts: In the approach
context, the dot appeared in one of the bottom corners
and, in the absence of button presses, moved past the
instrumental stimulus. Thus, participants had to actively
press the button repeatedly to move the dot centrally
toward the instrumental stimulus and collect it. In the
withdrawal context, the dot appeared in the middle of
the screen and by default moved upward through the
instrumental stimulus. In this case, button presses were
required to move the dot away from the instrumental
stimulus to avoid collecting it. Thus, there were four trial
types: approach-go, approach-no-go, withdrawal-go, and
withdrawal-no-go (Figure 1A). Thus the Action Context
determined whether the active response was an ap-
proach or a withdrawal response. Whether an instrumental
stimulus was collected was determined based on whether
the dot entered a goal region (invisible to the participant;
Figure 1A) around the instrumental stimulus. If the dot en-
tered this region (after go-approach or no-go-withdrawal),
then the stimulus was collected. If not (after no-go-
approach or go-withdrawal), then the stimulus was not
collected. At times, the dot could touch the target area
on the side, only entering it partially. In this case, feedback
consisted of the words: “pressed, but incomplete action”
and no money was won or lost. At the end of each full
action, monetary feedback (“+5 cents” or “−5 cents”) was
displayed.
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Toorthogonalize the approach-withdrawal and appetitive-
aversive axes, the learned instrumental values in approach
and withdrawal blocks needed to be matched. To achieve
this, both go and no-go responses were, if correct, rewarded
to the same extent. Additionally, to avoid a confound of
behavioral activation, in each condition (i.e., in both
approach and withdrawal conditions) the go action was
designated as the correct response for half of the instru-
mental stimuli, and the no-go action for the other half.
Incorrect responses had opposite outcome contingencies
to correct responses, yielding more punishments than
rewards. This ensured that go, no-go, approach, and with-
drawal overall had the same learned association with re-
wards and punishments. In both the approach and
withdrawal context, there were two go stimuli, which
yielded reward more often after active responses (and
punishment after not responding), and two no-go stimuli,
which yielded reward more often after not responding
(and punishment after go responding). Reinforcement
was probabilistic with probabilities ranging from 0.6 to 1
(on average, the ratio reward/punishment following a
correct action was 0.85:0.15 for go stimuli and 0.8:0.2 for
no-go stimuli; the difference arose from a technical error).
Trials were labeled as correct if participants chose the
usually rewarded response.
Average reinforcement was matched between approach
and withdrawal contexts (behavioral group: mean propor-
tion of positively reinforced trials for approach = 0.58; for
withdrawal=0.61, paired sample t test: t(14)=−0.8,p=.4;
fMRI group: mean proportion of positively reinforced trials
for approach = 0.63; for withdrawal = 0.64; paired sample
t test: t(17) = −0.14, p = .9). Accordingly, the difference
between approach and withdrawal actions cannot be driven
by Pavlovian responses to the instrumental stimuli. Thus,
rather than representing effects of competing Pavlovian
responses, the effects we report represent PIT effects.
Every session consisted of 80 instrumental training trials
alternating between blocks of eight approach and eight
withdrawal trials. Initial stimuli and action context were
randomized across participants.
Pavlovian Conditioning
Each Pavlovian conditioning trial started with the presen-
tation of one of three audiovisual stimuli consisting of a
pure tone and a fractal. The appetitive and aversive
Pavlovian CSs were followed, respectively, by 2 ml of
appetitive or aversive juice (i.e., the unconditioned stim-
uli [US]) on 50% of trials. The neutral CS was followed by
no ( juice) outcome. Before the fMRI experiment, par-
ticipants indicated their preference for apple juice, orange
juice, or strawberry lemonade. The aversive juice was a bit-
ter solution of magnesium sulphate (0.3 M). Each Pavlovian
CS was presented 20 times, and for each session there was
a separate set of three stimuli. Stimulus presentation order
was fully randomized across participants. Stimulus duration
was 4.5 sec, and juice delivery occurred between 0.5 and
Figure 1. Task description. (A) Instrumental training. Trials started
with the appearance of the instrumental stimulus at the top center of
the screen and of a dot at the bottom of the screen. In approach trials,
the dot started either on the left or on the right bottom side of the
screen. Participants could choose to do nothing (approach-no-go),
in which case the dot would wiggle past the instrumental stimulus.
Alternatively, they could push the button repeatedly to steer the dot
through the instrumental stimulus (approach-go). In withdrawal trials,
the dot started centrally at the bottom beneath the instrumental
stimulus. Participants could choose to push the button repeatedly to
avoid moving through instrumental stimulus (withdrawal-go) or to do
nothing (withdrawal-no-go). The four possible trajectories are drawn
in the figure (red and blue lines). The green square around the stimulus
(invisible to the participant) was the goal region. If the dot entered the
goal region, then the instrumental stimulus was collected. The straight
line just to one side of the instrumental stimulus was a reflecting
boundary that the dot could not cross. Timings were as follows:
Instrumental stimuli were presented for 2.5 sec, during which
responses were collected. After 2.5 sec, feedback was presented for
1 sec. The ITI was 1 sec (blank screen). (B) PIT. This paralleled
the instrumental training, except that Pavlovian stimuli tiled the
background. No outcomes were presented, but participants were
instructed that their choices counted toward the final total. Participants
were explicitly instructed that the juices were collected outside the
scanner, and they agreed before the start of the experiment to drink
them afterward. Timing of one trial was as follows: 250 msec after
the onset of the Pavlovian stimulus, the instrumental stimulus (and
dot) was overlaid on top of this Pavlovian stimulus. Duration of the
instrumental stimulus was 2.5 sec; duration of the Pavlovian stimulus
was 2.75 sec. Upon offset of both stimuli, feedback was presented,
which consisted only of the words “Balance is updated” (duration =
1 sec, ITI = 1 sec).
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1.5 sec after stimulus onset. The intertrial interval (ITI)
was 1 sec.
To test and stimulate task involvement during condition-
ing, query trials were presented after every 10 Pavlovian
trials. On these trials, participants chose one of the two pre-
sented Pavlovian stimuli (presented for 2 sec; ITI 0.5 sec) in
extinction, that is, there were no outcomes in these trials.
The outcomes were only recorded for the last session (be-
cause of technical error). In the fMRI group we further
assessed conditioning by asking participants to indicate
the degree to which they liked each of the juices and the
Pavlovian CSs by means of visual analogue scales (VAS),
before and after the experiment.
Pavlovian–Instrumental Transfer
Stimulus presentation was the same as in the instrumen-
tal training stage, except that (i) Pavlovian stimuli tiled
the background from 250 msec before and during the
instrumental trial and (ii) no monetary feedback and no
juice outcomes were presented (Figure 1B). However,
participants were instructed that their choices counted
toward the final monetary total and that the juices asso-
ciated with the Pavlovian stimuli were collected outside
the scanner for them to drink afterwards, that is, PIT was
conducted in nominal extinction.
Participants performed 96 PIT trials per session, alter-
nating between miniblocks of eight approach and eight
withdrawal trials. Initial instrumental stimulus, CS, and
action context were randomized. The numbers of go and
no-go stimuli were matched between conditions (i.e.,
Action Context × CS Valence). After every trial, feedback
consisted of a screen displaying “Balance is being updated.”
Image Acquisition
Whole-brain imaging was performed on a 3-Tesla MR
scanner (Magnetrom Tim Trio, Siemens Medical Systems,
Erlangen, Germany). Functional data were obtained
using a multiecho gradient T2*-weighted EPI (ME-EPI)
scanning sequence (Poser, Versluis, Hoogduin, & Norris,
2006) with BOLD contrast (38 axial-oblique slices; repe-
tition time = 2.32 sec; echo times = 9.0, 19.3, 30, and
40 msec; in plane resolution = 3.3 × 3.3 mm; slice thick-
ness = 2.5 mm; distance factor = 0.17; flip angle = 90°).
Visual stimuli were projected on a screen and were
viewed through a mirror attached to the head coil. In
addition, a high-resolution T1-weighted magnetization-
prepared rapid-acquisition gradient-echo anatomical scan
was obtained from each participant (192 sagittal slices;
repetition time = 2.3 sec; echo time = 3.03 msec; voxel
size = 1.0 × 1.0 × 1.0 mm; field of view = 256 mm).
Behavioral Data Analysis
The behavioral data were analyzed using the statistic soft-
ware SPSS 16.0, and the modeling was performed in
Matlab (2009b).
Instrumental Training
First, we assessed change in performance over time dur-
ing instrumental training. The proportion of correct re-
sponses was calculated for the first eight and last eight
trials separately for each of the four trial types. To assess
whether participants learned to make the correct choice
during instrumental training, data were averaged across
sessions and submitted to a repeated-measures ANOVA
with Time Bin (two levels: beginning/end of instrumental
training), Action Context (two levels: approach/withdrawal),
and Response Type (two levels: go/no-go) as within-subject
factors andGroup (two levels: behavioral/fMRI) as between-
subject factor. Second, we assessed whether the learned
behavior generalized to and over the PIT stage. This was
done with the same ANOVA with the difference that the
factor Time Bin was changed to include three levels: the
end of the instrumental training and the beginning and
the end of the PIT stage.
Pavlovian Conditioning
To assess Pavlovian conditioning, we investigated
whether the proportion of correct choices on query trials
differed from chance. In addition, liking ratings of the
CSs before and after conditioning were analyzed using
an ANOVA with Time of Rating (two levels: before/after
conditioning) and Valence (three levels: appetitive/neutral/
aversive) as within-subject factors.
Pavlovian–Instrumental Transfer
There were two dependent measures: choice (go/no-go)
and the number of button presses on go trials. Go trials
were defined as those PIT trials on which one or more
than one button press was made. All behavioral outcome
measures were averaged across sessions and submitted
to ANOVAs with Action Context (two levels: approach/
withdrawal), and Pavlovian CS Valence (three levels:
appetitive/neutral/aversive) as within-subject factors
and Group (two levels: behavioral/fMRI) as between-
subject factor. Planned contrasts were targeted at effects
of aversive PIT, that is, the primary focus of this study.
For these follow-up analyses, the three-level factor
Pavlovian CS Valence in the omnibus ANOVA was re-
placed by a Pavlovian CS Valence factor with two levels:
aversive and neutral.
Model-based Analyses
We anticipated that the expectation associated with each
instrumental stimulus would contribute to the BOLD
response. Therefore, we computed these expectations
(so-called instrumental Q values) using a reinforcement
learning model and included them in the fMRI analysis.
The reinforcement learning model and the fitting proce-
dures are described in detail in Huys et al. (2011). After
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fitting the parameters, the action values Qt1(at; st) deter-
mining choice probabilities on trial t were extracted and
used in the fMRI analysis.
fMRI Analysis
fMRI data analysis was performed with SPM5 software
(Statistical Parametric Mapping; Wellcome Trust Centre
for Cognitive Neuroimaging, London, UK). The first five
volumes of each participantʼs data set were discarded to
allow T1 equilibrium.
First, realignment parameters were estimated for the
images acquired at the first echo time and consequently
applied to images resulting from the three other echoes.
The echo images were combined by applying a PAID-
weight algorithm assessing the signal-to-noise ratio as
described by Poser et al. (2006). Thirty volumes, acquired
before each instrumental training session, were used as
input for this algorithm. Thereafter, the following prepro-
cessing steps were applied: slice-time correction, coregis-
tration, and a segmentation procedure using the tissue
probability maps provided by SPM5 for gray matter, white
matter, and CSF centered in Montreal Neurological Insti-
tute (MNI) space to estimate normalization parameters
based on the structural image. Structural as well as func-
tional images were then normalized by applying these
estimations. All normalized images were smoothed with
an isotropic 8 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel (Worsley &
Friston, 1995).
A random effects, event-related, statistical analysis was
performed with SPM5. This analysis was restricted to the
PIT stage. First, we specified a separate general linear
model (GLM) for each participant (Figure 2). For each
session, six main regressors represented the six PIT trials:
(1) approach appetitive, (2) approach neutral, (3) approach
aversive, (4) withdrawal appetitive, (5) withdrawal neutral,
and (6) withdrawal aversive. For each main regressor,
two additional parametric regressors were added (Büchel,
Wise, Mummery, Poline, & Friston, 1996): (i) One regressor
represented the tonic parametric modulation of BOLD
responses during each trial by the number of button
presses per trial: the PIT regressor (cf. Talmi et al., 2008).
(ii) Another regressor represented the parametric modula-
tion of BOLD responses by theQ value per trial as estimated
from the model-based analysis. These parametric modula-
tors were serially orthogonalized. Additionally, a regressor
of no interest modeled phasic button presses as single
events (cf. Talmi et al., 2008). All paradigm-related re-
gressors were modeled as delta functions at the onset of
the instrumental stimulus presentation per trial and were
convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response func-
tion. Realignment parameters (the three rigid-body transla-
tions and three rotations) were added to capture residual
movement-related artifacts. High-pass filtering (128 sec)
was applied to the time series of the functional images to
remove low-frequency drifts. Parameter estimates for all
regressors were obtained by maximum-likelihood esti-
mation, modeling temporal autocorrelation (AR1). The
parameter estimates, derived from this fit of the model to
Figure 2. Schematic depiction
of the GLM to analyze the PIT
data (figure after Talmi et al.,
2008). The main regressors (M)
model the onset of a trial as a
delta function. There is a main
regressor for each of the six
trial types. For all six main
regressors, there are two
parametric modulators (PM).
The first parametric modulater
(PM1), the PIT regressor,
consists of the number of
button presses made per trial
(0 for no-go). The second
parametric modulator (PM2)
represents the Q value for
each chosen action dependent
on the instrumental stimulus
shown in the trial at hand. In
the seventh main regressor
(of no interest), every single
button press is modeled by a
delta function. For reasons of
clarity, two of the six trial
types (approach appetitive
and withdrawal aversive)
are depicted only for one
session and no movement
nuisance regressors are shown.
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the data, reflect the strength of covariance between the
data and the canonical response function for each of the
regressors.
Parameter estimates for the six parametric PIT regres-
sors were estimated at the subject-level and then used in
a 2 × 3 ANOVA (full factorial design) at the group level
with factors Action Context (two levels: approach/
withdrawal) and CS Valence (three levels: appetitive/
neutral/aversive) as within-subject factors. Restricted max-
imum likelihood estimates of variance components were
used to allow for unequal variance between subjects and
possible deviations from sphericity introduced by depen-
dencies between levels in the repeated-measures design.
The main effects and interactions were then calculated.
We assessed the following three planned contrasts to
test our hypotheses, which focused on aversive PIT:
1. Main effect of CS Valence, contrasting aversive and neu-
tral CSs ([approach neutral + withdrawal neutral] −
[approach aversive + withdrawal aversive]). This con-
trast identified CS-dependent coupling of the BOLD
response with the number of button presses, that is,
aversive PIT-related BOLD responses independent of
Action Context.
2. Interaction between Action Context and CS Valence
([approach neutral − approach aversive] − [with-
drawal neutral − withdrawal aversive]). This contrast
identified BOLD responses associated with action-
specific aversive PIT.
3. Main effect of Action Context, contrasting approach and
withdrawal trials ([approach appetitive + approach
neutral + approach aversive] − [withdrawal appeti-
tive + withdrawal neutral + withdrawal aversive]).
This contrast identified regions where BOLD re-
sponses are action specific, that is, differ between
approach and withdrawal.
To investigate the valence specificity of the effects,
supplementary analyses were conducted to assess the same
three contrasts, with the CS Valence factor contrasting
appetitivewith aversive CSs and appetitivewith neutral CSs.
It is important to note that the parametric nature of
the PIT regressor ensures that the contrasts of interest
represent BOLD response involved in PIT and do not re-
flect differences in motor activity or Pavlovian CS per se
(cf. Talmi et al., 2008). However, this analysis explicitly
discounts signals that are constant, that is, do not vary
as a function the number of button presses during the
presentation of each CS. Therefore, following Talmi
et al. (2008), to take such signals into account we also
contrasted the main regressors (instead of the parametric
PIT regressors) at the subject level to calculate both a
main effect of CS Valence ([approach neutral + withdrawal
neutral]− [approach aversive + withdrawal aversive]) and
an interaction between CS Valence and Action Context
([approach neutral − approach aversive] − [withdrawal
neutral − withdrawal aversive]). The resulting statistical
parametric maps for each contrast were then used to
conduct a t test at the group level with behavioral aversive
PIT effects as a covariate. The behavioral aversive PIT effect
for each subject was computed in terms of the average
number of button presses, irrespective of Action Context
([approach neutral + withdrawal neutral] − [approach
aversive + withdrawal aversive]), and as a function of
Action Context ([approach neutral − approach aversive] −
[withdrawal neutral−withdrawal aversive]). These analyses
revealed regions in which CS-dependent BOLD responses
were associated with individual behavioral PIT effects.
Functional Connectivity Analyses
Next we assessed whether action specificity of behavioral
aversive PIT was accompanied by action-specific PIT-
related functional connectivity. Specifically, we conducted
psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis to assess
whether action-specific PIT was associated with PIT-
related modulation of functional connectivity with seed re-
gions exhibiting a main effect of Action Context. First, for
each individual, the (first principal component of the)
BOLD time series was extracted from an 8-mm sphere
surrounding the BOLD response peak revealed by the
main Action Context contrast (the seed; the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex [vmPFC]; Figure 6). The time series was
then deconvolved based on the canonical hemodynamic
response model to construct a time series of neural BOLD
responses following the procedures outlined by Gitelman,
Penny, Ashburner, and Friston (2003). Second, for every
participant, two GLMs were estimated, one for each Action
Context, which included the following three regressors (as
well as the six motion parameters): (1) the seed BOLD re-
sponse time series; (2) a parametric task contrast regressor
representing aversive PIT (neutral minus aversive); and
(3) the PPI regressor, that is, the interaction between
(1) and (2), computed by multiplication of the deconvo-
luted regressor (1) and regressor (2). The PPI regressor
was then convolved with the hemodynamic response
function. Parameter estimates for the PPI regressor were
estimated by maximum-likelihood estimation, modeling
temporal autocorrelation (AR1) at the subject level, and
were then used in a t test at the group level. The param-
eter estimates, derived from this fit of the model to
the data, reflect the strength of PIT-related connectivity
with the action-specific seed region (the vmPFC). To assess
the relationship between individual behavioral PIT effects
and functional PIT-related connectivity, covariates repre-
senting behavioral PIT effects (average number of button
presses during neutral minus aversive trials) were included
in the second level group analysis.
Statistical Thresholding and Volumes of Interest
We report only those effects that survive family-wise error
(FWE) correction for multiple comparisons at the whole
brain ( pFWE WB < .05, voxel level) or within volumes of
interest ( pFWE SV < .05, voxel level). On the basis of
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existing literature (Corbit & Balleine, 2005, 2011; Talmi
et al., 2008), we expected PIT effects in the amygdala
and the nucleus accumbens. Therefore, these regions
were defined as volumes of interest, using anatomical
criteria. The bilateral amygdala was defined using the
automated anatomical labeling atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer
et al., 2002). The bilateral nucleus accumbens was seg-
mented for each participant using the FSL FIRST segmen-
tation tool (Patenaude, Smith, Kennedy, & Jenkinson,
2011). These individual segments were then overlaid
onto each other, generating one nucleus accumbens
for the group. The amygdala and accumbens volumes
were combined, so that voxel level correction for multi-
ple comparisons was conducted for all voxels within
these two volumes. Furthermore, we had a specific hypoth-
esis regarding the action specificity of the PIT effects. In
particular, we reasoned that action specificity of PIT might
arise from Pavlovian effects on neural regions known to
implement instrumental action. One of the most promi-
nent regions implicated in instrumental action control is
the striatum (Balleine & OʼDoherty, 2010). Therefore, we
conducted additional (univariate and connectivity) anal-
yses of action-specific effects in the bilateral striatum,
defined as the caudate nucleus and putamen based on
the automated anatomical labeling atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer
et al., 2002).
RESULTS
Behavioral Data
Behavioral data are reported across the behavioral (n =
15) and fMRI group (n = 18). To facilitate interpretation
of the fMRI results, we additionally present the data for
the fMRI group separately. However, no significant differ-
ences between the groups were found.
Instrumental Conditioning
Analysis of the first stage of the experiment indicates
robust instrumental learning (Figure 3A). Participants
learned to make correct choices during the instrumental
learning stage indicated by an increasing number of cor-
rect responses over time, F(1, 31) = 97.9, p < .001.
Furthermore, these differences were affected by the
action context (approach or withdrawal) and changed
over time: There was a significant three-way interaction
between Time Bin, Action Context, and Response Type,
F(1, 31) = 34.0, p < .001. This was because of partici-
pants initially preferring to approach the instrumental
stimulus, that is, to go during approach (approach-go vs.
no-go at the beginning of instrumental training: t(32) =
8.9, p < .001) but to no-go during withdrawal (withdrawal-
go vs. no-go: t(32) = −4.6, p < .001; simple interaction
effect between Action Context and Response Type at the
end of instrumental training: F(1, 31) = 87.6, p < .001).
The bias toward withdrawal-no-go disappeared and the bias
toward approach-go became less strong but remained signif-
icant during learning (withdrawal-go vs. no-go at the end of
instrumental training: t(32) = −1.4, p > .1; appoach-go vs.
no-go at the end of instrumental training: t(32) = 2.4, p <
.05; simple interaction effect between Action Context ×
Response Type at the end of instrumental training: F(1,
31) = 7.1, p < .05).
Figure 3. Instrumental learning and generalization to the PIT stage
for (A) the whole group and for (B) the fMRI group separately. The
proportion of correct choices are broken down by Response Type
(go/no-go) and Action Context (approach/withdrawal). Error bars
represent SEMs. (C) VAS ratings before and after Pavlovian conditioning.
Bars represent group means of VAS scores (0 = very aversive, 0.5 =
neutral, 1 = very appetitive). Error bars represent SEMs (*p < .05).
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In addition, as is also explained by the interactions de-
scribed in the previous paragraph, there was a significant
interaction between Time Bin and Action Context, F(1,
31) = 5.7, p < .05, and a significant interaction between
Response Type and Action Context across Time Bins, F(1,
31) = 58.6, p < .001. Furthermore, there was a main ef-
fect of Response Type, because of participants making
more correct go responses than correct no-go responses
across the instrumental training (main effect of Response
Type: F(1, 31) = 13.4, p < .01). There was no significant
main effect of or interaction with the factor Group.
For the fMRI group alone, almost the same pattern was
found as for the whole group: Participants learned to
make correct choices during the instrumental learning
stage indicated by an increasing number of correct re-
sponses over time, F(1, 17) = 50.0, p < .001 (Figure 3B).
Additionally there was a three-way interaction between
Time Bin, Action Context, and Response Type, F(1, 17) =
26.2, p < .001. Again this was driven by the initial incli-
nation of participants to collect the instrumental stimulus:
Initially participants preferred to go during approach
(paired sample t test: t(17) = 5.3, p < .001) but to no-go
during withdrawal (paired sample t test: t(17) =−2.4, p<
.05; simple interaction effect between Action Context and
Response Type at Time Bin 1: F(1, 17) = 35.6, p < .001;
Figure 3B). These biases were overcome at the end of the
instrumental training stage (paired sample t test: t(17) =
0.5, p > .1; t(17) = −0.2, p > .1; simple interaction effect
between Action Context × Response Type at Time Bin 2:
F(1, 17) = 0.2, p > .1). In addition, there was a signifi-
cant interaction between Response Type and Action
Context across Time Bins, F(1, 17) = 10.9, p < .01.
Instrumental Generalization to the PIT Stage
Performance at the end of instrumental training generalized
to and persisted throughout the PIT stage (Figure 3A):
There were no significant main effects of or interactions
with Time Bin when the two-level factor Time Bin was
replaced with a Time Bin factor with three levels: the end
of the instrumental training, the beginning of the PIT stage,
and the end of the PIT stage. This was also the case when
considering data from the fMRI group only (Figure 3B).
Pavlovian Conditioning
In both groups, analysis of the Pavlovian query trials con-
firmed successful Pavlovian conditioning (behavioral
group: mean proportion correct = 95%, SEM = 3.1,
range = 58–100%; fMRI group: mean proportion correct =
94%, SEM = 1.9, range = 80–100%).
A one-sample t test on the liking ratings of the US (i.e.,
juices; only available for the fMRI group) showed that, at
baseline (pre), participants judged the aversive US to be
aversive (meanpre = 0.21, significantly different from 0.5:
t(17) = 14.4, p < .001 [scores ranged from 0 (aversive)
to 1 (appetitive) with 0.5 indicating neutral]) and the
appetitive US to be appetitive (significantly different from
0.5: meanpre = 0.70, t(17) = 4.1, p = .001). Ratings for
the aversive US did not change significantly over the
course of the experiment (pre vs. post, paired sample t test:
meanpost = 0.20, t(17) = 0.2, p > .05); the appetitive US
became slightly more appetitive across time (paired sample
t test: meanpost = 0.80, t(17) = 2.7, p < .05; CS Valence ×
Time: F(1, 17) = 5.1, p < .05).
VAS ratings for the Pavlovian CSs (only available for the
fMRI group) showed that Pavlovian conditioning induced
changes in subjective liking (ANOVA Time × CS Valence:
F(1.3, 22.3) = 10.6, p = .002; Figure 3C). Simple Time
(pre/post) × CS Valence (two levels) interaction analyses
confirmed that conditioning altered ratings for the aver-
sive relative to the neutral CS, F(1, 17) = 9.6, p = .007,
for the appetitive relative to the neutral CS, F(1, 17) =
6.0, p = .026, and for the appetitive relative to the aver-
sive CS, F(1, 17) = 12.4, p = .007. There were no differ-
ences between the three CSs before conditioning (paired
sample t test: appetitive vs. neutral, t(17) = 1.5, p > .1,
appetitive versus aversive, t(17) = 0.8, p > .1, neutral
versus aversive, t(17) = −0.6, p > .1). Conversely, after
conditioning, liking ratings were significantly higher for
the neutral than for the aversive CS, F(1, 17) = 10.9, p <
.01, for the appetitive than for the neutral CS, F(1, 17) =
9.7, p< .01, and for the appetitive than for the aversive CS,
F(1, 17) = 24.5, p < .001.
Pavlovian–Instrumental Transfer
Analysis of choice (go vs. no-go) data from the PIT stage
revealed a significant action-specific PIT effect, which
partially replicated that reported by Huys et al. (2011).
Thus, the proportion of approach-go responses was low-
er during display of the aversive CS than that during
display of the neutral CS (i.e., participants exhibited con-
ditioned suppression). Conversely, the proportion of
withdrawal-go responses was higher during display of
the aversive CS than that during display of the neutral
CS (Figure 4). This observation was confirmed statistically
by a significant two-way interaction between Action Con-
text (approach vs. withdrawal) and CS Valence (aversive
vs. neutral; for the group as a whole: F(1, 31) = 6.8, p <
.05; for the fMRI group only: F(1, 17) = 3.3, p = .085).
Furthermore, simple effects analyses confirmed the pres-
ence of statistically significant simple effects of CS Va-
lence (aversive vs. neutral) for approach (whole group:
F(1, 31) = 5.4, p < .05; fMRI group only: F(1, 17) =
2.1, p > .1) as well as for withdrawal (whole group: F(1,
31) = 5.1, p < .05; fMRI group only: F(1, 17) = 0.4, p >
.1). Thus, our task successfully revealed aversive PIT, an
effect that was action specific.
In contrast, we did not find evidence for appetitive PIT.
On the one hand, the omnibus F test with CS Valence as
a three- instead of two-level factor (appetitive vs. neutral
vs. aversive) did reveal a significant two-way interaction
between Action Context and CS Valence (whole group:
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F(2, 62)=4.2,p<.05; fMRI grouponly: F(2, 34)=2.3p>.1
[linear contrast: F(1, 17) = 3.7, p= .069]), However, in con-
trast to our hypotheses, when appetitive CSs were com-
pared with neutral CSs, there was no simple main effect of
CS Valence (whole group: for approach: F(1, 17) = 0.9, p>
.1; for withdrawal: F(1, 17) = 0.4, p > .1) and no simple
interaction effect between Action Context and CS Valence
(whole group: F(1, 31) = 0.7, p > .1). This suggests that
our task was not appropriate for measuring appetitive PIT.
Irrespective of CS Valence, participants made more go-
responses in the approach than in the withdrawal context
(whole group: main effect of Action Context, F(1, 31) = 4.4,
p< .05. Thismain effect of Action Context concurs with the
pattern of performance in the initial instrumental training
stage, which also revealed a main effect of Action Context.
There were no significant effects of the factor Group
(behavioral/fMRI). Consistent with this lack of effect, the
performance patterns were similar when analyzed separately
for the fMRI group (Figure 4B), although the effects did not
reach statistical significance (for stats see above).
There were no effects in terms of the total number of
button presses (Table 1).
Imaging Data
BOLD Responses in the Amygdala and Nucleus
Accumbens during Aversive PIT
We first performed an ANOVA using the parametric PIT
regressors, and with Action Context (approach/withdrawal)
and CS Valence (appetitive/neutral/aversive) as within-
subject factors. There were no main effects of CS Valence
and no interactions between Action Context and CS
Valence, as revealed by whole-brain analyses and by small
volume analyses (of the amygdala, nucleus accumbens,
and the striatum).
However, when taking individual differences in behav-
ioral PIT effects into account, we observed significant
brain–behavior correlations in the amygdala and the
nucleus accumbens: Participants who exhibited greater
aversive inhibition of instrumental responding (across
approach and withdrawal contexts) showed higher BOLD
responses during aversive relative to neutral CSs (Figure 5).
This was revealed by an ANOVA with the main regressors
and the behavioral aversive PIT effect in terms of button
presses as a covariate.
These brain–behavior correlations were because of
significant associations between individual differences
in the behavioral aversive PIT effect and BOLD re-
sponses in the bilateral amygdala and in the left nucleus
accumbens. These effects in the amygdala and nucleus
accumbens were present irrespective of Action Context.
These analyses did not reveal any action-specific brain–
behavior correlations, even when analyzed within our
small volumes including the striatum. Thus, BOLD re-
sponses in the amygdala and nucleus accumbens to
aversive CSs predicted individual differences in aversive
Pavlovian inhibition, in a manner that was independent
of Action Context.
The effects were also unique to aversive CSs and did
not extend to appetitive CSs: A supplementary analysis
contrasting appetitive and neutral CSs did not yield effects.
Furthermore, supplementary analyses comparing aversive
and appetitive CSs did not reveal the effects seen above in
the comparison between aversive and neutral CSs. This
lack of effect when including appetitive CSs might be
because of increased variability during the appetitive CSs.
Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex Differentiates between
Approach and Withdrawal Context
Whole-brain ANOVA with the parametric PIT regressors
(Action Context [approach/withdrawal] × CS Valence
Figure 4. Behavioral data from the PIT stage. Shown are choice data
as a function of Action Context (approach/withdrawal) and CS Valence
(appetitive/neutral/aversive) for (A) the whole group and (B) the
fMRI group separately. Error bars represent SEMs of the difference
between, respectively, trials with appetitive and neutral CSs and
trials with aversive and neutral CSs (*p < .05).
Table 1. Average Number of Button Presses for the fMRI
Group as a Function of Action Context (Approach/Withdrawal)
and CS Valence (Appetitive/Neutral/Aversive) during the
Pavlovian–Instrumental Transfer Stage (SEM )
Action Context
Approach Withdrawal
Appetitive 8.64 (0.27) 8.71 (0.30)
Neutral 8.78 (0.34) 8.66 (0.26)
Aversive 8.33 (0.32) 8.47 (0.36)
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[appetitive/neutral/aversive]) revealed a main effect of
Action Context in the vmPFC (Figure 6). BOLD responses
in this region were higher in the approach than in the
withdrawal context. The inverse effect was observed in
the bilateral lingual gyrus (t = 9.57, pFWE WB = .001, MNI
coordinates: xyz = [16 −74 0] and [−2 −78 18]) and in
the bilateral precuneus (t = 6.0, pFWE WB = .001, xyz =
[10 −54 48] and [−10 −48 48]). Small volume analyses
of responses in the amygdala, nucleus accumbens, and
striatum did not reveal any subcortical action specificity.
Action Specificity of Aversive PIT Is Accompanied by
Action-specific Fronto-striatal Connectivity
Next we assessed whether action specificity of behavioral
aversive PIT was accompanied by PIT-related functional
connectivity with this action context-specific BOLD re-
sponse in the vmPFC. To this end, we conducted PPI
analyses, separately for the approach and the withdrawal
context, with the action-specific vmPFC region as the
seed (Figure 6) and with a task contrast regressor repre-
senting aversive PIT (the number of button presses for
aversive vs. neutral CSs).
When individual differences in behavioral PIT effects
were not taken into account, small volume analyses re-
vealed a significant effect in the striatum (centered on the
caudate nucleus; MNI coordinates: xyz = [−12 20 4]) for
withdrawal, but not approach. Specifically, in the with-
drawal condition, there was a significant positive contribu-
tion of the vmPFC to the caudate nucleus during aversive
PIT (Figure 7A). Thus, PIT-related connectivity between
the vmPFC and the caudate nucleus was higher during
aversive than during neutral CSs. No such effects, across
the group as a whole, were found for the approach condi-
tion. However, when individual differences in behavioral
PIT effects were taken into account, both small volume
and even whole-brain analyses revealed a significant effect
for the approach condition, again in the caudate nucleus
(MNI coordinates: xyz = [−4 12 12] and [−14 26 2];
Figure 7B). This effect reflected a negative association
between the behavioral aversive PIT effect and the PPI
effect: Greater aversive Pavlovian inhibition of approach
responding was associated with reduced connectivity
between the vmPFC and the caudate nucleus during
aversive relative to neutral CSs. Thus, action-specific sig-
nal in the vmPFC contributed in a CS-dependent manner
to the BOLD signal in the caudate nucleus. The same
effect was significant in the bilateral nucleus accumbens
(small volume correction with the nucleus accumbens
and amygdala VOI: t = 4.98, pFWE SV = .017, MNI coordi-
nates: xyz = [10 18 −2]; t = 4.82, pFWE SV = .017, xyz =
[−12 10−8]). This effect was unique to the striatum and
the nucleus accumbens, as whole-brain and small volume
correction analysis did not reveal any other meaningful
effects.
DISCUSSION
This study addressed two key questions concerning human
PIT. First, unlike prior studies, it revealed the neural
mechanisms underlying PIT in the aversive domain and
Figure 5. Aversive PIT-related BOLD response in the bilateral
amygdala and left nucleus accumbens. The left image depicts regions of
the amygdala (bilateral) where change in BOLD response between
neutral and aversive CS trials was positively related to behavioral
inhibition during aversive CS trials compared with neutral CS trials
(small volume correction with the nucleus accumbens and amygdala
VOI: t = 5.45, pFWE SV = .009, MNI coordinates of peak voxel: xyz =
[−30 −4 −16]; t = 4.47, pFWE SV = .044, xyz = [32 −4 −14], covariate:
mean = 0.32, SD = 0.71). The right image shows that the same effect is
significant for the left nucleus accumbens (t = 4.97, pFWE SV = .020,
xyz = [−14 8 −14]). Images are displayed at a statistical threshold of
p < .001 uncorrected.
Figure 6. Action-specific BOLD response in the vmPFC. There was
a main effect of Action Context in the vmPFC (t = 5.25, pFWE WB = .019,
MNI coordinates of peak voxel: xyz = [−8 36 −8]). The bar graph
shows parameter estimates from the peak voxel for the different
Action Contexts. Images are displayed at a statistical threshold of
p < .001 uncorrected.
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enabled us to conclude that the human amygdala and
nucleus accumbens are involved in the effects of aversive
Pavlovian cues on instrumental behavior. Second, this
study addressed, for the first time, the neural mechanisms
underlying action specificity of human PIT. Differential
responses for approach and withdrawal were found in the
vmPFC. Furthermore, aversive CSs modulated functional
connectivity between the vmPFC and the caudate nucleus,
both regions strongly associated with goal-directed in-
strumental control (Balleine & OʼDoherty, 2010; Valentin,
Dickinson, & OʼDoherty, 2007). These results suggest
that one origin of action specificity of PIT lies in the en-
gagement of goal-directed control systems, such as the
vmPFC and the caudate nucleus, and involves Pavlovian
regulation of goal-directed fronto-striatal circuitry.
These findings generally concur with long established
observations that the vmPFC is key for the affective con-
trol of behavior (Rushworth, Noonan, Boorman,Walton, &
Behrens, 2011; Wallis, 2007; Clark &Manes, 2004; Greene,
2001; Damasio, 1997; Damasio & Everitt, 1996). Indeed,
this region receives abundant input from regions that pro-
cess affective information including the amygdala and the
nucleus accumbens (Haber &Knutson, 2010; Haber, 2003;
Ongür & Price, 2000; Mayberg et al., 1999), and it is critical
for the instrumental guidance of behavior by representa-
tions of current goals (Valentin et al., 2007). Furthermore,
recent electrophysiological findings in rats suggest that
subsets of neurons in the vmPFC are involved in the inte-
gration of Pavlovian and instrumental information that un-
derlies PIT (Homayoun & Moghaddam, 2009). This fMRI
study did not reveal PIT signals in the vmPFC that evi-
dence such integration. However, the pFC is well known
not to act alone in guiding decision-making but interacts
with a set of strongly connected subcortical structures via
fronto-striatal circuits (Haber & Knutson, 2010; Haber,
2003; Alexander, DeLong, & Strick, 1986). In keeping with
this, we found PIT-related connectivity between the vmPFC
and the caudate nucleus as well as PIT-related signals in
subcortical structures, such as the amygdala and nucleus
accumbens.
Our study aimed specifically to address the neural
mechanisms of action specificity in PIT. The finding that
the vmPFC codes action specificity was obtained despite
the fact that the values of approach and withdrawal goals
(or actions) were the same (paired sample t test on action/
Q values: t(17) = −1.5, p > .1). This is remarkable given
previous work showing an important role for the vmPFC
in representing goal (or action) values (Kahnt, Heinzle,
Park, & Haynes, 2011; Hare, Camerer, Knoepfle, & Rangel,
2010; de Wit, Corlett, Aitken, Dickinson, & Fletcher, 2009;
Hare, Camerer, & Rangel, 2009; Kable & Glimcher, 2009;
Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008). Its implication in
goal-directed control is substantiated by another previous
finding showing that BOLD responses in this region
change as a function of outcome devaluation (Valentin
et al., 2007). Our finding that approach behavior engages
the vmPFC to a greater extent than does withdrawal
Figure 7. Functional connectivity during action-specific, aversive PIT.
(A) The PPI analysis of aversive PIT in withdrawal showed PIT-related
connectivity between the left caudate nucleus and the vmPFC (small
volume correction with the striatum VOI: t = 4.08, pFWE SV = .031,
xyz = [−12 20 4]). The bar graph shows parameter estimates from
the peak voxel. This reveals that PIT-related connectivity between the
vmPFC and the caudate nucleus was higher during aversive than during
neutral trials. (B) For aversive PIT in approach the brain image shows
that PIT-related connectivity between the vmPFC and the caudate
nucleus was associated with behavioral PIT effects (FWE correction for
multiple comparisons for the whole brain: t = 10.50, pFWE WB = .001,
xyz = [−4 12 12]; t = 9.75, pFWE WB = .002, xyz = [−14 26 2],
covariate: mean = 0.45, SD = 1.05). To interpret this association,
parameter estimates from the peak voxel of the PPI analysis are shown
in the bar graph for participants with high and low behavioral aversive
PIT effects, that is, with high and low behavioral inhibition during
presentation of the aversive CS (median split). This reveals that
PIT-related connectivity between the vmPFC and the caudate nucleus
was lower during aversive than during neutral trials for participants
who showed more behavioral inhibition. Images are displayed at a
statistical threshold of p < .001 uncorrected.
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behavior might reflect the fact that, in this paradigm,
there is an asymmetry between approach and withdrawal.
Because the goal state (the instrumental stimulus) is more
clearly delineated for approach than for withdrawal, it is
conceivable that approach behavior is driven more readily
by a goal-directed system (critically involving the vmPFC)
than withdrawal behavior. According to an alternative, not
mutually exclusive account, the differential response in the
vmPFCmight also reflect differences in visual attention paid
to the goal state. Indeed, Lim,OʼDoherty, and Rangel (2011)
have recently shown that the vmPFC encodes (relative)
value signals as a function of visual attention. This hypoth-
esis also concurs with the finding that in our paradigm
BOLD effects in visual occipital regions differentiated with-
drawal from approach. Thus, action specificity in this PIT
task might originate in systems that represent action values
in a manner that is modulated by the goal state space
and/or visual attention.
The observation that aversive PIT was accompanied by
Pavlovianmodulation of influences from this action-specific
vmPFC on the caudate nucleus further strengthens the
hypothesis that action specificity in PIT involvesmodulation
of goal-directed control systems. Indeed, the rodent ho-
mologue of the caudate nucleus, that is, the dorsomedial
striatum, has also been shown to be sensitive to changes in
outcome devaluation (Yin, Knowlton, & Balleine, 2005;
Yin, Ostlund, Knowlton, & Balleine, 2005). Furthermore,
our findings reveal a strong relationship between the inhi-
bition of instrumental approach by aversive Pavlovian cues
and disruption of fronto-striatal connectivity by aversive
Pavlovian cues. On the basis of this result, we speculate
that aversive Pavlovian inhibition of approach (i.e., con-
ditioned suppression) is accompanied by frontal sup-
pression of striatal processing. The reverse pattern was
observed for withdrawal, in which fronto-striatal connec-
tivity was enhanced by the aversive cues, consistent with
the speculation that aversive Pavlovian potentiation of
withdrawal is accompanied by frontal enhancement of
striatal processing. This proposal generally concurs with
ideas that choice and planning of appropriate actions are
instantiated by spiralling fronto-striatal pathways, includ-
ing those connecting the vmPFC and the caudate nucleus
(Balleine & OʼDoherty, 2010; Haber, Fudge, & McFarland,
2000). Our connectivity findings indicate that processing
in these pathways can be modulated by aversive Pavlovian
CSs. This chimes well with our recent findings that inhibi-
tory Pavlovian responses are able to significantly constrain
goal-directed choice behavior (Huys et al., 2012).
The observation that the amygdala and the nucleus
accumbens are involved in PIT concurs with animal studies
showing that the influence of appetitive Pavlovian cues on
instrumental decision-making depends on the integrity of
the amygdala and nucleus accumbens (Corbit & Balleine,
2005, 2011). These studies have suggested that the amyg-
dala represents the affective valence of Pavlovian cues,
whereas the nucleus accumbens is thought to represent a
limbic-motor interface, transmitting affective information to
the spiraling cortico-striatal pathways. Our findings are also
consistent with results from a study in humans revealing
activity in both these regions during appetitive PIT (Talmi
et al., 2008). That study showed that appetitive Pavlovian
effects on instrumental vigour were associated with BOLD
signal in the ventral striatum during appetitive cues com-
pared with neutral cues. In addition, brain–behavior asso-
ciations showed that participants who exhibited stronger
behavioral PIT also exhibited stronger responses in the
ventral striatum and amygdala. The key conclusion of this
study is that these regions are also involved in aversive PIT.
Unlike the pattern of responses in the vmPFC and unlike
the pattern of connectivity with the caudate nucleus, the
responses in the amygdala were not action specific, sug-
gesting that it participates in Pavlovian inhibition of instru-
mental actions regardless of their approach/withdrawal
nature.
The primary interest of this study was to uncover neu-
ral mechanisms of aversive rather than appetitive PIT.
However, it is notable that, unlike prior work, this study
did not replicate an effect of appetitive PIT in the amyg-
dala or in the nucleus accumbens (cf. Talmi et al., 2008).
We emphasize that our failure to demonstrate appeti-
tive PIT does not diminish the validity of the paradigm
for measuring aversive PIT. Nevertheless, in the follow-
ing we consider a few hypotheses regarding this lack
of effect. One key difference is that we used different
outcomes for the Pavlovian and instrumental training
stage and that our paradigm therefore captures exclu-
sively outcome-general PIT. Talmi et al. (2008) used the
same outcomes for both stages, and the effects they see
in the nucleus accumbens and amygdala could there-
fore conceivably be driven by both outcome-general and
outcome-selective PIT effects. Although animal work does
suggest that both these regions are involved in outcome-
general as well as outcome-selective PIT (Corbit & Balleine,
2005, 2011), the only extant study in humans on appetitive
outcome-specific PIT did not find significant involvement
of either the nucleus accumbens or amygdala (Bray et al.,
2008). Thus, it may be that appetitive PIT BOLD signals in
the human amygdala and accumbens are too weak to be
observed in paradigms that tap into only outcome-specific
or only outcome-general PIT. This could be addressed in
future work by increasing the number of trials per subject.
Another difference between our and previous work is that
we used primary (i.e., appetitive juice) rather than second-
ary reinforcement (i.e., money) as Pavlovian USs. It is pos-
sible that involuntary reception of a juice while lying supine
is not as appetitive as receiving money, although our sub-
jective liking ratings did not suggest this was the case. Alter-
natively, extinction might have been faster for the appetitive
than for the aversive juice.
Similar to Talmi et al. (2008), we found that PIT effects
were more robust outside than inside the scanner. This
replicated attenuation of PIT effects in, but not outside,
the scanner, might reflect masking by non-specific fac-
tors. The scanner environment is loud and stressful and
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may well mask subtle behavioral effects that depend on
the display of background stimuli. Nevertheless, it should
be noted that we did observe significant behavioral PIT
over the group as a whole and, moreover, we also ob-
served significant brain–behavior associations, strength-
ening our conclusion that the neural effects relate to
behavioral PIT.
Our results suggest that outcome-general PIT involves
affective regulation of goal-directed behavioral control
systems. This generally concurs with the only PIT study
in humans, which has shown that outcome-specific PIT
can be sensitive to outcome-devaluation (Allman, DeLeon,
Cataldo, Holland, & Johnson, 2010; see, however Holland,
2004, for different results in rodents). The current study
suggests that, at least in humans, this might also hold for
outcome-general PIT.
An understanding of how Pavlovian stimuli influence
ongoing behavior may illuminate important aspects of
pathological behavior. For example, one might conceptua-
lize reactive aggression as seen in many mood (Monahan
et al., 2001) or personality disorders (Coccaro, Sripada,
Yanowitch, & Phan, 2011) as a potentation of aversive
PIT. Aspects of proactive aggression, as seen in psycho-
pathy (Cornell et al., 1996), might on the other hand reflect
attenuated aversive PIT. This speaks to the notion that
psychopathology could arise not only from abnormality
within particular behavioral control systems, such as
Pavlovian or goal-directed ones, but also from alterations
in their interaction (Huys et al., 2012). Further exploration
of these hypotheses will require experiments involving
patient groups and precise characterization of interactions
between the different behavioral control systems involved.
As such, this study represents a stepping stone to future
studies to advance our knowledge on affective, Pavlovian
influences over instrumental behavior.
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